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PERFECTION HIERARCHIES AND NONTEMPORAL
PRIORITY RULES
RANDAL C. PICKER*

INTRODUCTION

The most basic rule in all of Article 9 is that the earlier of first to
file or perfect has priority, embodied for generations of secured
transactions lawyers in UCC section 9-312(5) (now in Revised section
9-322(a)(1)). Of course, this means that in contests between two
secured creditors, both of whom filed to perfect their security
interests, the first to file wins. The rule also covers that rare situation
where a secured creditor perfected first by possessing the collateral,
say, a laptop, an intervening secured creditor filed, and then the first
secured creditor filed before giving up possession. In that case,
because the rule is the earlier of first to file or perfect wins, assuming
no intervening period of neither filing nor perfection, the secured
creditor who initially took possession has priority, even though its
financing statement was second. In both cases, though, it is time that
matters: the first one, where one is defined appropriately, wins. And,
note that in this framework, possession of the laptop and filing against
it are on par: from the secured creditor's perspective for the purpose
of achieving perfection and priority, they are perfect substitutes. (Not
so for the debtor, of course, who cannot write papers without her
laptop, hence the rise of filing over time.) Given the substitutability of
filing and possession in the rule of UCC section 9-312(5), we
determine priority by mapping both events to the single metric of
time, giving rise to the mantra, the earlier of first to file or perfect
wins.
We could run the system differently; indeed, to some extent we
have always done so, but the combination of Revised Article 8 and
now Revised Article 9 makes real inroads in changing the basic
* Paul and Theo Leffmann Professor of Commercial Law, The University of Chicago and
Director, Olin Program in Law and Economics. I thank the Sarah Scaife Foundation and the
Lynde & Harry Bradley Foundation for their generous research support, and Steve Harris, Saul
Levmore, and Eric Posner for their comments.
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scheme of perfect substitutability among different methods of
perfection mapped over to the single scale of time. Instead, to some
extent, and perhaps less than we should have, we have embraced the
idea of a perfection hierarchy: some methods of perfection are better
than others. A secured creditor who perfected first through an
inferior means runs the risk of losing priority to a later secured
creditor who perfects through a superior means. Method of
perfection, or status, matters, and we must first categorize our secured
creditors by method before we can assign priority. Of course, if we
have more than one secured creditor using the same method, we will
need a rule for assigning priority within classes, and we might
reintroduce time and temporal priorities at that point. Indeed, this is
exactly what Revised Article 9 has done.
This paper is divided into four parts. Part I sketches the new
perfection scheme of Revised Article 9 and its reliance on the idea of
control over collateral. Part II examines the origins of the different
methods of perfection. Part III looks at the role that notice filing has
played in secured transactions, while Part IV develops a role for
perfection hierarchies, nontemporal priority, and the usefulness of
control in that regard.
To preview that conclusion and the argument that leads to it, it is
important to recognize that having collateral subject to Article 9 and
its rules covering financing statements makes the cost of creating and
perfecting a security interest the same for all creditors. Excluding
collateral from Article 9-as we have traditionally done with deposit
accounts-creates cost differentials among creditors. Cost differentials can help match collateral with creditors. Absent a cost, creditors
may take too much collateral. Uninformed borrowers will ignore the
scope of the security interest sought, while informed borrowers may
be reluctant to tip their hands by negotiating over the scope of the
security interest. An initial creditor may take a very broad security
interest without any intent of taking the steps necessary to ensure a
return on some of the collateral. At the same time, the breadth of the
security interest taken by the nonreliance creditor may impair the
ability of a reliance creditor to obtain a return on its investment in
monitoring collateral. All of this shrinks the credit available to the
debtor.
A perfection hierarchy may solve this problem. Let perfection
through filing vest priority rights against one class of creditors, say
unsecured creditors and lien creditors. At the same time, create a
second method of perfection-say, control-that makes it possible for
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a second creditor to jump ahead of the filed secured creditor. If this
second method of perfection is sufficiently costly, we will discourage
nonreliance creditors from using it and thereby create a way for
reliance creditors to recover on their efforts by allowing them to
obtain priority. This structure does a better job of matching collateral
taken and reliance on it, assuming that control is a good proxy for
reliance.
I. THE ROLE OF CONTROL IN REVISED ARTICLE 9

Pick a seemingly obscure place to start, namely, UCC section
9-308, on the purchase of chattel paper and instruments:
A purchaser of chattel paper or an instrument who gives new value
and takes possession of it in the ordinary course of his business has
priority over a security interest in the chattel paper or instrument
(a) which is perfected under Section 9-304 (permissive filing and
temporary perfection) or under Section 9-306 (perfection as to
proceeds) if he acts without knowledge that the specific paper
or instrument is subject to a security interest; or
(b) which is claimed merely as proceeds of inventory subject to a
security interest (Section 9-306) even though he knows that the
specific paper or instrument is subject to the security interest.
For my purposes, the key feature of this section is the different status
that it gives to a secured creditor who takes possession of chattel
paper from one who perfects through filing. Obviously, the rule is
substantially more textured than that description suggests, but the key
idea of a perfection hierarchy is clearly at work here. Secured
creditors are presented with the opportunity to structure their
respective priorities through the choice of the method of perfection.
Taking possession of the chattel paper ensures that another secured
creditor cannot jump ahead of the possessor. Filing against chattel
paper just creates a perfected security interest good against lien
creditors and, therefore, the trustee in bankruptcy asserting the status
of a hypothetical lien creditor under section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code, but makes it possible for another secured creditor giving new
value to acquire priority against the chattel paper without negotiating
with the filed secured creditor.
This is an example of a nontemporal priority, one that is tied to
both the status of the winner-new value, ordinary course of business,
and the absence of knowledge of the competing security interest-as
well as to the method of perfection used by the winner, here
possession of the chattel paper or the instrument. Article 9 has always
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had other nontemporal priorities as well, such as the special status
given to purchase money security interests.1 This priority was
implemented through status alone-traced new value, coupled with
an appropriately timed filing, and, in the case of inventory, advance
notice.
Revised Article 9 makes few important changes to the
fundamental principles of the statute. Perhaps the most important
consistent change throughout Article 9 relates to the expanded role
for the idea of control as a means of establishing priority and
perfection. This tracks generally the way that control has been used in
Revised Article 8 relating to investment property. In Revised Article
9, control serves a number of important purposes in implementing
key changes to the statute:
" Deposit Accounts. Original security interests in deposit
accounts may now be taken and perfected under Article 9.
Control operates as a way of policing the manner in which a
security interest in a deposit account is perfected. Allowing
filing to perfect the security interest in the deposit account
would have made it quite easy-too easy in the eyes of
many-to take a perfected security interest in a deposit
account. Insisting on control over that account may mean that
only genuine reliance creditors will take security interests in
deposit accounts. Do note that the depositary bank has a
substantially lower cost of obtaining control, as it
automatically has control if it takes a security interest in the
2
deposit account.
*

*

Filing Against Instruments. A secured creditor can now
perfect a security interest in an instrument through filing.
Such a filing serves the purpose of providing notice of the
security interest in the instrument, just as it always had for
other categories of collateral. Still, there may be
circumstances in which having the secured creditor take an
additional step beyond filing adds value-recall the discussion
of UCC section 9-308-and having control serve as a superior
method of perfection for instruments creates a carrot to get
our secured creditor to take that additional step.
Support Obligations. The explicit treatment of support
obligations and property securing such obligations necessi-

1. See U.C.C. §§ 9-107, 9-312(3)-(4).
2. See R. § 9-104(a)(1).
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tated a decision about the appropriate method of perfecting a
security interest in these rights. Again, control is a natural way
to implement a two-tier perfection system based on nontemporal priorities.

Revised sections 9-104 through 9-107 set forth the circumstances

3
under which control has been established over deposit accounts,
electronic chattel paper, 4 investment property,5 and letter-of-credit
rights. 6 Revised section 9-314 legitimates control as a method of

3. SECTION 9-104. CONTROL OF DEPOSIT ACCOUNT.
(a) Requirementsfor control.A secured party has control of a deposit account if:
(1) the secured party is the bank with which the deposit account is maintained;
(2) the debtor, secured party, and bank have agreed in an authenticated record
that the bank will comply with instructions originated by the secured party
directing disposition of the funds in the account without further consent by
the debtor; or
(3) the secured party becomes the bank's customer with respect to the deposit
account.
(b) Debtor's right to directdisposition.A secured party that has satisfied subsection (a)
has control, even if the debtor retains the right to direct the disposition of funds
from the deposit account.
4. SECTION 9-105. CONTROL OF ELECTRONIC CHATTEL PAPER. A secured
party has control of electronic chattel paper if the record or records comprising the
chattel paper are created, stored, and assigned in such a manner that:
(1) a single authoritative copy of the record or records exists which is unique,
identifiable and, except as otherwise provided in paragraphs (4), (5), and (6),
unalterable;
(2) the authoritative copy identifies the secured party as the assignee of the record or
records;
(3) the authoritative copy is communicated to and maintained by the secured party or
its designated custodian;
(4) copies or revisions that add or change an identified assignee of the authoritative
copy can be made only with the participation of the secured party;
(5) each copy of the authoritative copy and any copy of a copy is readily identifiable
as a copy that is not the authoritative copy; and
(6) any revision of the authoritative copy is readily identifiable as an authorized or
unauthorized revision.
5. SECTION 9-106. CONTROL OF INVESTMENT PROPERTY.
(a) Control under Section 8-106. A person has control of a certificated security,
uncertificated security, or security entitlement as provided in Section 8-106.
(b) Control of commodity contract. A secured party has control of a commodity
contract if:
(1) the secured party is the commodity intermediary with which the commodity
contract is carried; or
(2) the commodity customer, secured party, and commodity intermediary have
agreed that the commodity intermediary will apply any value distributed on
account of the commodity contract as directed by the secured party without
further consent by the commodity customer.
(c) Effect of control of securities account or commodity account. A secured party
having control of all security entitlements or commodity contracts carried in a
securities account or commodity account has control over the securities account or
commodity account.
6. SECTION 9-107. CONTROL OF LETTER-OF-CREDIT RIGHT. A secured
party has control of a letter-of-credit right to the extent of any right to payment or
performance by the issuer or any nominated person if the issuer or nominated person
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property types and sets forth rules for the
control takes place and how long that
also need to know whether any other
for these collateral types. For deposit

accounts, other than as proceeds, control is the exclusive acceptable
perfection method. 8 A security interest in investment property or
chattel paper (including electronic chattel paper) may be perfected
through filing. 9 A security interest in a letter-of-credit right may be

perfected only through control, except that a security interest in any
supporting obligation for collateral (including a letter-of-credit
righti o) arises through perfection of a security interest in the collateral
itself."
With the perfection rules in hand, we can then turn to priority.
Revised sections 9-327 through 9-330 set forth the priority rules
relating to deposit accounts, 12 investment property, 3 letter-of-credit

has consented to an assignment of proceeds of the letter of credit under Section
5-114(c) or otherwise applicable law or practice.
7. SECTION 9-314. PERFECTION BY CONTROL.
(a) Perfection by control.A security interest in investment property, deposit accounts,
letter-of-credit rights, or electronic chattel paper may be perfected by control of
the collateral under Section 9-104, 9-105, 9-106, or 9-107.
(b) Specified collateral: time of perfection by control; continuation of perfection. A
security interest in deposit accounts, electronic chattel paper, or letter-of-credit
rights is perfected by control under Section 9-104, 9-105, or 9-107 when the secured
party obtains control and remains perfected by control only while the secured
party retains control.
(c) Investment property: time of perfection by control; continuation of perfection. A
security interest in investment property is perfected by control under Section
9-106 from the time the secured party obtains control and remains perfected by
control until:
(1) the secured party does not have control; and
(2) one of the following occurs:
(A) if the collateral is a certificated security, the debtor has or acquires
possession of the security certificate;
(B) if the collateral is an uncertificated security, the issuer has registered or
registers the debtor as the registered owner; or
(C) if the collateral is a security entitlement, the debtor is or becomes the
entitlement holder.
8. See R. § 9-312(b).
9. See id. § 9-312(a).
10. See id. § 9-102(a)(77).
11. See id. §§ 9-308(d), 9-312(b)(2). There are also temporary perfection rules that need to
be considered as well, see id. § 9-312, though I will omit those here.
12. SECTION 9-327. PRIORITY OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN DEPOSIT
ACCOUNT. The following rules govern priority among conflicting security interests in
the same deposit account:
(1) A security interest held by a secured party having control of the deposit account
under Section 9-104 has priority over a conflicting security interest held by a
secured party that does not have control.

1999] PERFECTION HIERARCHIES AND NONTEMPORAL PRIORITY RULES

1163

rights, 4 and of a purchaser of chattel paper or an instrument. 5 We
(2) Except as otherwise provided in paragraphs (3) and (4), security interests
perfected by control under Section 9-314 rank according to priority in time of
obtaining control.
(3) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (4), a security interest held by the bank
with which the deposit account is maintained has priority over a conflicting
security interest held by another secured party.
(4) A security interest perfected by control under Section 9-104(a)(3) has priority
over a security interest held by the bank with which the deposit account is
maintained.
13. SECTION 9-328. PRIORITY OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN INVESTMENT
PROPERTY. The following rules govern priority among conflicting security interests in
the same investment property:
(1) A security interest held by a secured party having control of investment property
under Section 9-106 has priority over a security interest held by a secured party
that does not have control of the investment property.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in paragraphs (3) and (4), conflicting security
interests held by secured parties each of which has control under Section 9-106
rank according to priority in time of:
(A) if the collateral is a security, obtaining control;
(B) if the collateral is a security entitlement carried in a securities account and:
(i) if the secured party obtained control under Section 8-106(d)(1), the
secured party's becoming the person for which the securities account is
maintained;
(ii) if the secured party obtained control under Section 8-106(d)(2), the
securities intermediary's agreement to comply with the secured party's
entitlement orders with respect to security entitlements carried or to be
carried in the securities account; or
(iii) if the secured party obtained control through another person under
Section 8-106(d)(3), the time on which priority would be based under this
paragraph if the other person were the secured party; or
(C) if the collateral is a commodity contract carried with a commodity
intermediary, the satisfaction of the requirement for control specified in
Section 9-106(b)(2) with respect to commodity contracts carried or to be
carried with the commodity intermediary.
(3) A security interest held by a securities intermediary in a security entitlement or a
securities account maintained with the securities intermediary has priority over a
conflicting security interest held by another secured party.
(4) A security interest held by a commodity intermediary in a commodity contract or
a commodity account maintained with the commodity intermediary has priority
over a conflicting security interest held by another secured party.
(5) A security interest in a certificated security in registered form which is perfected
by taking delivery under Section 9-313(a) and not by control under Section 9-314
has priority over a conflicting security interest perfected by a method other than
control.
(6) Conflicting security interests created by a broker, securities intermediary, or
commodity intermediary which are perfected without control under Section 9-106
rank equally.
(7) In all other cases, priority among conflicting security interests in investment
property is governed by Sections 9-322 and 9-323.
14. SECTION 9-329. PRIORITY OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN LET-FER-OFCREDIT RIGHT. The following rules govern priority among conflicting security
interests in the same letter-of-credit right:
(1) A security interest held by a secured party having control of the letter-of-credit
right under Section 9-107 has priority to the extent of its control over a conflicting
security interest held by a secured party that does not have control.
(2) Security interests perfected by control under Section 9-314 rank according to
priority in time of obtaining control.
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also need to take account of rules outside of Article 9 that may affect
priority, such as status as a holder in due course,16 as well as setoff
17
rights against deposit accounts.

For my purposes, the most salient feature of this priority scheme
is that perfection through control is superior to perfection through
another manner, such as filing. Put differently, we have created a
perfection hierarchy, and we no longer seek to map over all of our

methods of perfection to a single, temporal metric. A secured creditor
who takes control over a deposit account will have priority over one
who merely claims it as proceeds, who will typically rely on a filed

financing statement to perfect its interest.' Again, a secured creditor
with control over a letter-of-credit-right has priority over another
15. SECTION 9-330. PRIORITY OF PURCHASER OF CHATTEL PAPER OR
INSTRUMENT.
(a) Purchaser'spriority: security interest claimed merely as proceeds A purchaser of
chattel paper has priority over a security interest in the chattel paper which is
claimed merely as proceeds of inventory subject to a security interest if:
(1) in good faith and in the ordinary course of the purchaser's business, the
purchaser gives new value and takes possession of the chattel paper or
obtains control of the chattel paper under Section 9-105; and
(2) the chattel paper does not indicate that it has been assigned to an identified
assignee other than the purchaser.
(b) Purchaser's priority: other security interests. A purchaser of chattel paper has
priority over a security interest in the chattel paper which is claimed other than
merely as proceeds of inventory subject to a security interest if the purchaser gives
new value and takes possession of the chattel paper or obtains control of the
chattel paper under Section 9-105 in good faith, in the ordinary course of the
purchaser's business, and without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights
of the secured party.
(c) Chattel paper purchaser's priority in proceeds. Except as otherwise provided in
Section 9-327, a purchaser having priority in chattel paper under subsection (a) or
(b) also has priority in proceeds of the chattel paper to the extent that:
(1) Section 9-322 provides for priority in the proceeds; or
(2) the proceeds consist of the specific goods covered by the chattel paper or cash
proceeds of the specific goods, even if the purchaser's security interest in the
proceeds is unperfected.
(d) Instrumentpurchaser'spriority. Except as otherwise provided in Section 9-331(a), a
purchaser of an instrument has priority over a security interest in the instrument
perfected by a method other than possession if the purchaser gives value and takes
possession of the instrument in good faith and without knowledge that the
purchase violates the rights of the secured party.
(e) Holder of purchase-money security interest gives new value. For purposes of
subsections (a) and (b), the holder of a purchase-money security interest in
inventory gives new value for chattel paper constituting proceeds of the inventory.
(f) Indication of assignment gives knowledge. For purposes of subsections (b) and (d),
if chattel paper or an instrument indicates that it has been assigned to an identified
secured party other than the purchaser, a purchaser of the chattel paper or
instrument has knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the secured
party.
16. See U.C.C. § 9-309; R. § 9-331.
17. See R. § 9-340.
18. See id. § 9-327(1).
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secured creditor perfecting under another method. 19 The same is true
for investment property ° and, in a more complicated fashion, for
electronic chattel paper.2 1 This is not to say that time has become
irrelevant, for even here, if two parties perfect through control, the
first to achieve control usually has priority. 22 Nonetheless, the broader
use of control coupled with the perfection hierarchy just described
means that we have stepped away importantly from our temporal,
earlier-of-first-to-file-or-perfect priority scheme.
II. WHY PERFECTION AND WHY THROUGH THESE MEANS?

As the prior section makes clear, Revised Article 9 now has three
basic perfection methods, ignoring for these purposes cases of
automatic, statutory perfection, 23 temporary perfection, 24 or
perfection through notation on a certificate of title. 21 Perfection
through possession is the traditional pledge; perfection through filing
is perhaps the defining item of modern secured transactions law.
Perfection through control is the new kid on the block, though it
obviously has roots in perfection through possession. Given these
three basic devices for perfecting, a number of questions should be
considered. Start with the most basic: why perfection at all?
A. Perfection and Priority
Perfection is just one of Article 9's instruments for describing a
legal status and keying consequences to that status. Perfection is often
described as being related to priority, but there is no simple
relationship between perfection and priority. Priority may exist even
without perfection. In other cases, priority is tied directly to
perfection and is both necessary and sufficient for priority. Yet, in
other cases, perfection is necessary but not sufficient for priority.
To be more concrete, consider a contest between a secured
creditor and an unsecured creditor. An unperfected secured creditor
is senior to an unsecured creditor, so perfection is not necessary for
19.
20.
21.
22.
Revised
23.
24.
25.

See id. § 9-329(1).
See id. § 9-328(1).
See id. § 9-330(a).
For deposit accounts, see Revised section 9-327(2); for investment property, see
section 9-328(2); and for letter-of-credit rights, see Revised section 9-329(2).
See R. § 9-309.
See, e.g., id. § 9-312.
See id. § 9-303.
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priority, as the secured creditor will be senior without being
perfected. Perfection, though, is sufficient for priority, as the
perfected secured creditor is senior to the unsecured creditor. 26 In
contrast, in a competition between a secured creditor and a lien
27
creditor, an unperfected secured creditor is junior to a lien creditor,
while a perfected secured creditor has priority over a lien creditor as
to all funds advanced by the secured creditor at the time the
previously unsecured creditor becomes a lien creditor, and for at least
forty-five days thereafter. 28 Perfection is both necessary and sufficient
for priority against the lien creditor, but even then only for funds
advanced by the secured creditor during a particular time period. In a
third case, perfection is necessary but not sufficient to establish
priority. An unperfected secured creditor loses to another perfected
secured creditor.29 Perfection is necessary for the first secured creditor
to have superior rights as against the second perfected secured
creditor but is insufficient standing alone to establish priority. For two
perfected secured creditors, priority is generally dated by the earlier
of first to file or perfect.30 As this should make clear, perfection says
nothing necessarily about priority against a given competing creditor:
either way, perfected or unperfected, the secured creditor can win or
lose, depending on the competitor.
That said, it would be a mistake to lose sight of how important
perfection is for the secured creditor. Although the unperfected
secured creditor would triumph in a competition with an unsecured
creditor, it is unlikely that the contest will be so framed. The
unsecured creditor can-and will-take steps to improve its position
by becoming a lien creditor. As a lien creditor has priority over an
unperfected secured creditor, an unsecured creditor always has a
route available that will enable it to change the momentary priority of
the unperfected secured creditor. Perfection is the way that the
secured creditor ensures that it maintains any priority that it enjoys
against an unsecured creditor. First and foremost, to say that a
secured creditor is perfected is to say that an unsecured creditor
cannot jump ahead of the secured creditor. Perfection is also essential
for the secured creditor to compete successfully with other secured
creditors. Again, this is not literally true: Revised section 9-322(a)(3)
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See
See
See
See
See

id. § 9-201.
id. § 9-317(a)(2).
id. § 9-323(b).
id. § 9-322(a)(2).
id. § 9-322(a)(1).

1999] PERFECTIONHIERARCHIES AND NONTEMPORAL PRIORITY RULES

1167

provides a rule of priority based on the time of attachment to resolve
priority disputes between attached but unperfected secured creditors.
Nonetheless, it is highly unlikely that a dispute would arise in that
context; one or both of the creditors would try to perfect, and Revised
section 9-322(a)(3) would cease to apply.
B. Origins of the Ostensible Ownership Problem
So step back and ask again: why do we require an additional act
for the security interest to be effective against third parties? The
traditional explanation focuses on the problem of ostensible
ownership. Consider the analysis in Clow v. Woods,31 a Pennsylvania
case decided in 1819. Hancock and Poe formed a partnership. At
some point thereafter, Hancock granted a mortgage on property to
Clow, who had guaranteed certain of Hancock's debts. The mortgage
covered
all those goods and chattels now in [Hancock's] tanyard in Liberty
street, in the Northern Liberties of Pittsburg (to wit), all the bark
and tools and implements of trade of the party of the first part, all
his calf-skins in32bark, and all his sides of leather in bark, with the
appurtenances.
We are told nothing about whether this property was related to
Hancock's partnership with Poe or wholly separate. That partnership
dissolved and was settled through an "amicable suit" for the
adjustment of their accounts. Sheriff Woods levied on the material in
Hancock's tanyard to enforce the judgment obtained from the suit.
Clow sought to divert the proceeds of that levy away from Poe to
Clow based on the mortgage and sued the sheriff to force that result.
Poe had no notice of the mortgage until the levy was made and
Sheriff Wood received notice of it only after he had arrived on
Hancock's premises. The mortgage had not been recorded. The legal
issue presented was whether the mortgage was good against Poe
notwithstanding that failure.
The court held that the mortgage transaction was a per se fraud
33
against creditors and was void under the statute of 13 Elizabeth.
That statute rendered void any conveyance made to the end, purpose,
and intent of defrauding creditors. Both judges, Gibson and Duncan,
issued opinions. The opinion of Gibson cut to the heart of the
31. 5 Serg. & Rawle 275 (Pa. 1819).
32. Id. at 277.
33. See id. at 283, 288.
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problem quickly:
The law will not and ought not to permit the owner of personal
property to create an interest in another, either by mortgage or
absolute sale, and still continue to be the ostensible owner; and
where the creating of such an interest is the sole object, the
conveyance will be fraudulent, whether it contain a stipulation for
retention of possession or not; for to indulge 3the
motive that led to
4
the arrangement would be against true policy.
Which policy? The clear concern was the ability of the borrower to
cheat subsequent creditors:
But where, from the nature of the transaction, possession cannot be
given, the parties ought in lieu, to do every thing in their power to
secure the public from that deception which the possession of
property without the ownership always enables a person to
practice.35
Duncan's opinion emphasizes the same issues and forecasts the death
of credit were a contrary outcome to obtain:
In chattels, possession is the strongest evidence of ownership. That
a secret mortgage to secure a creditor, without any change of
possession, the debtor in the daily and constant occupation of the
goods, without valuation or inventory or specification accompanying the instrument, should be valid and bind the property against
creditors, or sales made by the debtor without notice, would be a
reproach to the law. It ought not, it cannot be so. If it were so, it
would put an end to all credit. Credit is given on the possession, on
the faith, that the man who was once the owner
of goods, continues
36
the owner, until he parts with the possession.
Note what this says before turning to whether it is right. The vision
presented is that prospective creditors rely on the appearance of
ownership of property in making lending decisions. Unlike the real
estate system, where the public records provide a chain of title to
establish ownership, evidence of ownership of personal property is
tied directly to possession of that property. An unrecorded mortgage
is, therefore, a secret lien, and it purports to divide the ownership of
the property in a way that is incompatible with the possession of the
property.
C. Problems with the Ostensible Ownership Problem Analysis
Now step back to see if this analysis holds up. There is a certain
internal incoherence to this system: the problem of mistaken
34. Id. at 279-80.
35. Id. at 282.
36. Id. at 288.
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inferences from possession is to be solved by requiring that an
effective security interest be created by turning over possession of the
property to the secured creditor. This, of course, was the pledge
system, where the secured creditor took possession of the property
but did not become the owner of the property. This is the separation
of ownership and possession that Clow decries and that defines the
pledge system.
We should also question the informational assumptions made in
Clow. The public record is hardly the only source of information
about a debtor. Even though Dun & Bradstreet did not have an
online service available in 1819, there was probably much "public"
information known in small, closely-knit communities. And, we
should not discount too quickly the possibility of learning valuable
information from the debtor itself. A prospective trade creditor meets
with the debtor and inquires about whether the debtor has any
outstanding security interests. The assumption in Clow must be that
the debtor will deny such interests in an effort to lure the trade
creditor into providing credit at a lower interest rate than would
otherwise be available were the security interest made known. While
this may seem obviously right, closer examination suggests that the
analysis is less straightforward. First, we should consider the possibility of explicit contractual provisions addressing preexisting security
interests, with penalties attached to the breach of such a provision.
Many creditors will require an affirmative covenant about the
existence of security interests ("Debtor hereby covenants that, as of
this date, there are no outstanding security interests against its
property"). Although a penalty provision may be of little solace if the
debtor is indeed insolvent, we students of failure should not lose sight
of the fact that some businesses actually succeed. The unsecured
creditor may learn of the breach eventually-by happenstance or,
more systematically, by searching periodically for new financing
statements against the debtor-and stick the debtor with the penalty
when it has the wherewithal to pay. A sufficiently large penalty-paid
when the debtor is solvent-may be enough to induce the debtor to
act truthfully.
Penalty clauses have been notoriously difficult to get enforced in
the courts, 37 notwithstanding the substantial benefits that might flow
from doing So. 38 We should instead ask whether there are other ways
37. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRAcTS § 12.18, at 895 (1982).
38. That said, we should not overstate. Analysis of liquidated damage clauses is quite
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to get the debtor to report its situation honestly. We could, for
example, as was once contemplated-apparently briefly-impose a
duty on the secured creditor to take care to ensure that the debtor
tells creditors of the secured creditor's interest. 39 A breach of that
duty would give rise to an action for damages against the secured
creditor to the extent of the harm suffered and caused by the breach.
The existence of the duty should cause the secured creditor to act
aggressively to ensure that the other creditors of the debtor learn of
its security interest. Implementing this, though, would force litigation
over the ever slippery questions of what did the debtor tell to the
suing creditor, what did the creditor otherwise know, and what would
the creditor have done had the required knowledge been created.
These are not questions one could litigate with any confidence, and a
legal system should be reluctant to tie outcomes to questions it cannot
answer well.
So speak not of duties but incentives. It is possible that creditors
would derive substantial comfort from the knowledge that a secured
creditor was paying close attention to the debtor. As Gilmore puts it,
the other creditors might "benefit[] from the fact that a professional
with a substantial stake in the enterprise was acting as their
policeman." 4 Other creditors can reduce their efforts to police the
debtor's behavior if they can piggyback on the steps taken by the
secured creditor. 4' This means that we can eliminate many steps taken
in parallel by trade creditors, for example, and replace them with the
efforts of the secured creditor. In this story, the savvy debtor wants to
disclose that it has a secured creditor as a way of ensuring other
creditors that the debtor will be policed. Debtors, in the fashion of
modern homeowners, should post signs stating, "These premises
protected by Secured Creditor Co."
D. Inferences and Information Revelation
We have focused so far on whether a debtor with a preexisting
complex and turns on a group of tricky factors. See Alan Schwartz, The Myth that Promisees
Prefer Supracompensatory Remedies: An Analysis of Contracting for Damage Measures, 100
YALE L.J. 369 (1990); Lars A. Stole, The Economics of Liquidated Damage Clauses in
ContractualEnvironments with PrivateInformation, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 582 (1992).
39. For Gilmore's account of the quick death of the proposal he raised while serving as
Reporter for Article 9, see 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY
§ 15.1, at 464 (1965).
40. Id. § 8.3, at 261.
41. See generally Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59
U. CHI. L. REV. 645 (1992).
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security interest would disclose that interest when faced with the
inevitable request for a disclosure of all such interests. Another
possibility has been put forward: namely, that debtors without
preexisting security interests will be eager to show prospective
lenders that they have no such interests and that the activities of these
debtors will sufficiently distinguish security-interest free debtors from
debtors with encumbered property so as to reveal the latter.41 Imagine
a world with two types of borrowers, those with encumbered property
and those without. The assumption here-and this is the same
assumption that we saw in Clow-is that debtors would like to be
seen as unencumbered so as to borrow at lower rates. These
unencumbered debtors will make every effort to demonstrate that
they have no outstanding security interests. They will open their
books, give copies of their correspondence, do anything necessary to
convince the prospective lender that there is no prior security interest
in place. Debtors with preexisting security interests, goes the story,
will not be eager to open their books for inquiry and, in so doing, will
signal to the lender that they indeed do have outstanding security
interests. Here, silence speaks volumes.
The problem with this, though, is that the borrower with a
security interest may not remain silent but may instead aggressively
misrepresent the facts. For the lender to be able to learn who does
and does not have an outstanding security interest, the lender must be
able to separate borrowers who actually have no outstanding security
interests from those who claim to have no outstanding security
interests. This is very much in the nature of trying to prove a negative.
The lying borrower will have taken steps to hide evidence that would
otherwise exist, and, as we have discussed above, penalties tied to a
misrepresentation may or may not work. Beyond this, as noted
before, the debtor may want to disclose its secured creditors as part of
a bonding effort to assure its other creditors that they are protected.
Of course, you might think, if this story is true, debtors would be in
the business of lying about the existence of a preexisting security
interest rather than its nonexistence. (We switch from the horror of
the secret lien to the problem of the trumped-up secured creditor.)
An answer is that a trade creditor can verify the secured creditor's
existence once it has been disclosed, and only if the secured creditor
is colluding with the debtor will we have the problem of fake secured
creditors.
42. See Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities,18 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 220-22 (1989).
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We have been considering whether the ostensible ownership
problem identified in Clow is as substantial as that case suggests and
whether its solution -continued reliance on the pledge- makes sense
given the problem. The pledge creates an ostensible ownership
problem, though one that might be surmounted by widespread
knowledge of the customs of secured creditors. We have also looked
at the informational assumptions embedded in the ostensible
ownership problem analysis. There are certainly ways that contracts
might shrink the problem through penalty clauses, though the law
itself has rendered this an ineffective approach. In addition, the
debtor may be a source of information, either voluntarily through
verifiable disclosures or involuntarily by comparison with the acts of
other debtors in like circumstances. Taken together, this suggests that
there may not be a central, unalterable information vacuum about the
debtor and that we may not need to be able to infer ownership from
possession in the way envisioned by the judges in Clow. All of that
would support greater reliance on a system of security interests
without a separate act of public notice. Whether we would want to
move to such a system would clearly depend on the relative costs of
running a system of public notice versus the type of private
information gathering described above.
III. THE RISE OF NOTICE FILING

In any event, that is not where we are today. The historical-and
current -alternative to all of this, and the direct response to the
ostensible ownership problem described in Clow, is to require a
security interest to be recorded in the public files. It is understandable
why we needed an alternative to the pledge and its requirement of
delivery of possession of the collateral. It is foolish to insist on
possession of property to create and perfect a security interest if
doing so would remove the property from its highest use. Only paper
property--instruments or chattel paper perhaps-can be transferred
without a substantial loss of use. So some alternative was required.
A. Filingas Public Notice
Filing makes it possible for other creditors to learn of a security
interest by creating a way to verify whether property in the debtor's
possession may be subject to divided ownership, fee simple in the
debtor subject to the lien of the secured creditor. Understanding the
circumstances where filing actually matters, though, takes some work.
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It is far from obvious, for example, that public filing addresses the
concerns identified in Clow, namely, that creditors would lend money
to the debtor and be deceived as to their rights against the debtor's
property. To see this, imagine a system where public recordation of a
mortgage makes it effective against both prior and subsequent
unsecured creditors. That is a conventional system: indeed, it is
Article 9's. Should an unsecured creditor rely on the absence of a
recorded mortgage in extending credit? No, of course not. The debtor
could grant a mortgage today, the creditor could record tomorrow,
and the unsecured creditor would be junior. The yet-to-be-granted
mortgage is the ultimate secret lien, and yet nothing prevents a
subsequent grant. The requirement of recordation does permit the
unsecured creditor to confirm that no creditor enjoys priority at the
time the unsecured creditor extends credit, but no assurance of
subsequent priority is created. The unsecured creditor is in no
position to rely on the state of the record. This was almost certainly
the situation in Clow. Poe's judgment arose out of his partnership
with Hancock, which existed long before the mortgage was granted.
As a result, Poe's credit arrangements with Hancock were not
influenced in any way by the subsequent mortgage to Clow. Whether
the mortgage was recorded or unrecorded has few direct decisionmaking consequences for Poe, given that the mortgage arose
subsequent to the creation of the underlying contingent debt from
Hancock.
B. Unsecured Creditorsand Record Notice
This substantially undercuts the idea that public filing is an
adequate response to the ostensible ownership problem. The
unsecured creditor simply cannot rely on the record as it exists at the
time of lending to ensure priority. Priority can be lost-legitimatelythrough subsequent events. Now ask whether we substantially change
the risks faced by an unsecured creditor if we allow priority not only
for security interests granted and recorded after the fact-and of
course for security interests granted and recorded before the
unsecured debt arises-but also for unrecorded security interests,
both subsequent and earlier. Again, a subsequent security interest
does not affect the unsecured creditor's lending decision, and how we
split the assets between an unsecured creditor and a subsequent
unrecorded secured creditor is just a question of distribution. So
consider the best case for the unsecured creditor: a contest between
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the unsecured creditor and a secured creditor asserting priority based
on an earlier unrecorded security interest. The unsecured creditor
might contend that had it known of the earlier security interest, it
would not have lent money to the debtor. The unsecured creditor has
behaved foolishly if that is true. Nothing would prevent the debtor
from granting a mortgage after the unsecured creditor had lent
money, and that would have the same distributional consequences for
the unsecured creditor as recognizing a prior unrecorded security
43
interest.
The point of this is that recordation of security interests should
be relatively unimportant for decisions by unsecured creditors to
extend credit." Filing, therefore, does not appear to be a meaningful
response to the heart of the ostensible ownership theory, which is that
unsecured creditors extend credit based on the appearance of
ownership. We, thus, need some other basis for why perfection is
important. Unsecured creditors make other decisions, though, and we
should determine whether public recordation of security interests
might influence those decisions in a useful way. Consider, for
example, how an unsecured creditor goes about getting paid when a
debtor has refused to pay. The unsecured creditor must decide
whether to undertake the costly steps required under state law to turn
a debt due into a judgment, with the ultimate goal of executing on
that judgment.
What does the creditor accomplish in running this process? The
private benefit to the creditor, of course, is that the creditor increases
the likelihood that it will get paid. The broader public benefit is that,
in theory at least, lien creditors provide a public service to their fellow
creditors by levying on property. The levy will become known to the
debtor's creditors quickly and will let them know in no uncertain
terms that the debtor's business is in financial difficulty. Creditors can
piggyback on the monitoring efforts of their fellow creditors by
reacting after the levy. The levy will trigger a substantial contraction
of the credit available to the debtor: suppliers will seek to collect and
may not extend new credit, other creditors may pursue levies of their
own. This is a familiar dynamic, and it will often lead to a bankruptcy

43. Assuming, of course, that the new mortgage would not be overturned as a preference
under section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code in a subsequent bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 547
(1994).
44. Indeed, it has been suggested that unsecured creditors rarely check the public records
when they make their lending decisions. See Douglas G. Baird, Notice Filing and the Problem of
Ostensible Ownership, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 53, 55 (1983).
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filing.
We should pause to consider whether this is a good thing. The
conventional wisdom is that debtors on average file for bankruptcy
too late. If that is right, we should look for ways to get debtors to file
for bankruptcy at the right time.4 A contraction of credit may be
socially useful: the debtor is denied additional dollars that it might
otherwise dissipate, and value already in the debtor's hands is
preserved. Providing information about the debtor could serve an
important function along this road. A reason to proceed cautiously
here, though, goes to the question of how disparate information is
aggregated in small situations such as this one. It is possible that
creditors will attach too much weight to the new information, will
discount their own information, and that, lemming like, all the
creditors will rush in to dismember the debtor. This "herd behavior"
might happen as part of a chain of individually rational inferences
even though were the totality of information available to the creditors
aggregated appropriately, they might conclude that the debtor should
not be in bankruptcy. 46 This tells us that encouraging a public step
such as a levy is not necessarily the right thing to do. Nonetheless, you
have to make a call sometime, and my guess is that doing so is useful.
C. Priorityand MarginalIncentives
Were we to eliminate the priority that lien creditors enjoy over
unperfected secured creditors, would they have the incentive to
provide the information that the levy conveys? The monitoring and
other actions that lead to the levy are costly, of course, and must be
compensated or they will not be undertaken. If we eliminated the lien
creditor priority of Revised section 9-317, the lien creditor's levy
would always be junior to the priority of the preexisting unperfected
secured creditor. That is offset in part by the fact that the lien
creditor's interest becomes senior to the rights of unsecured creditors.
The empirical question presented is whether unsecured creditors
need the extra incentive provided by the ability to achieve priority
over an unperfected secured creditor to induce them to provide the
information that the levy provides. I don't know the answer, but it is
certainly the case that one effect of the priority given to judgment lien
45. See generally Randal C. Picker, Voluntary Petitions and the Creditors' Bargain, 61 U.
CIN. L. REV. 519 (1992).
46. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 213-17 (1994) for

discussion and additional citations.
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creditors over unperfected secured creditors is to give them a means
of recovering the costs they undertake in making the levy. If the
secured creditor is always senior, even if unperfected, we have
reduced the probability that the lien creditor will be able to recover
its enforcement costs and get any benefit from its newly-earned
priority over unsecured creditors." Even under the current rules, lien
creditors will often levy only to discover that the prior claim of a
secured creditor exhausts the value of the property. This problem
would be exacerbated if we allowed the unperfected security interest
to have priority as well. Therefore, a possible justification for the rule
that a secured creditor must file to perfect to have priority over
unsecured creditors is that it makes it more likely that an unsecured
creditor will recover the costs of levying and will, therefore, take that
4
step to the benefit of all creditors. 1
D. Structuring Competition Among Creditors
So far we have focused on the consequences of perfection-or its
absence-for unsecured creditors. Perhaps we should be looking in
another direction, namely, to what perfection means for other secured
creditors. I argued earlier that perfection had no necessary
relationship to priority. What then does perfection say? Perfection is
about notice-easily evidenced, or verified, notice-which in turn is
about how we organize the competition that takes place among
creditors. Focus on perfection through filing a financing statement.
For the competition between secured creditors in creating a security
interest, a new secured creditor need only check the public records to
see which secured creditors may be prior to its new interest. The act
of perfecting is fused with the act of determining priority, and all of
this can be done in a single, simple transaction. Filing the financing
statement draws relatively bright lines of demarcation for secured
47. Of course, section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code may be the most severe limit on this
incentive, as it may allow the trustee to avoid many prepetition levies.
48. Note that this suggests that we should be careful about carrying this rule over into
bankruptcy as we currently do through the hypothetical lien creditor power created in section
544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. The dominant view of bankruptcy argues that nonbankruptcy
entitlements should be mapped into bankruptcy and justifies allowing the trustee in bankruptcy
to avoid unperfected security interests on those grounds. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC
AND LIMrTs OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 70-75 (1986). The analysis in the text suggests that Revised
section 9-317(a)(2)'s importance is in the pre-bankruptcy period when we are concerned about
creating public information about the debtor so as to induce appropriate decisions about filing
for bankruptcy. That need vanishes once the bankruptcy has been initiated. Nonbankruptcy
rules designed to get us to the collective proceeding in the right fashion and at the right time
need not be carried over into bankruptcy.
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creditors and allows them to stake out their rights against the
4
debtor. 1
This is an important and more general notion. The rules of
secured transactions play a part in structuring, or organizing, the
resulting competition that occurs among creditors, both initially when
security interests are created and, perhaps more importantly, when
the firm fails and its assets are at risk. The easiest way to think about
this is to recall the childhood game, musical chairs. As you will recall,
the game involves children walking around a circle of chairs while
music plays. The music stops, and the children scramble to find a seat.
Round by round, one chair is removed so that one child is left
standing. That child exits the game, the remaining children stand, the
music restarts, and another chair is removed from the game. The
game continues until we are left with two players, one chair, and a
final fight over the last chair to determine the winner.
Musical chairs is about scarcity, a very structured scarcity to be
sure, but scarcity nonetheless. Ask how the play of the game would
change as we altered the rules for allocating chairs. Suppose that
some players were allowed to reserve chairs ahead of time: how
would that influence the play of the game for those players and for
the other players? Suppose that other chairs could not be subject to
such a reservation: how would that effect competition for those
chairs?
Ask the same questions about competition among creditors for
the assets of the failing firm, and focus on the way that the secured
transactions rules can influence that competition. The instruments we
might draw upon to do this might be the cost of creating secured
transactions, the scope of assets subject to a security interest, and
whether the effectiveness of a security interest is absolute or
dependent on the resolution of one or more contingencies. For
example, the costs of undertaking a secured transaction might be
influenced quite directly by the setting of a fee for the filing of a
financing statement. A high fee would discourage secured
transactions; a low fee would encourage them. Different fees for
different asset types-say, low fees for equipment and high fees for
deposit accounts-would tilt the tables in favor of security interests in
one asset and against security interests in a second.
Lest this be thought of as bizarre, we should remember that this
is effectively the world we have lived in, once we note that filing fees
49. See Baird, supra note 44, at 62.
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are not the only costs associated with secured transactions. UCC
section 9-104's general exclusion of deposit accounts from Article 9's
coverage meant that security interests in deposit accounts were
created in reliance on nonuniform law, a leftover from the days
before Article 9's systematization of the law of secured transactions.
It was on average easier and, therefore, cheaper to create a security
interest in equipment, which, of course, was covered under old
Article 9, than it was to create a security interest in excluded deposit
accounts. The exclusion of deposit accounts created the two-tier cost
structure described before, and cost and exclusion operate as linked
policy instruments.
Cost differentials undoubtedly influence the competition that
takes place among creditors. Fewer security interests were taken in
deposit accounts under the nonuniform system; this meant that there
was a greater chance of a ready pool of assets available in a
bankruptcy to fund the administrative apparatus required to run such
a bankruptcy. Changing Article 9 by making it possible to take a
perfected security interest in a deposit account creates new uniformity
and reduces the cost of taking security interests in deposit accounts.
How much that cost is reduced turns directly on the method of
perfection used for deposit accounts.
E. Matching Collateraland Creditors:Reliance and Nonnreliance
Creditors
Cost differentials not only influence whether assets are available
to priority and unsecured creditors; they also influence the match that
takes place between assets and particular secured creditors. If there is
no marginal cost for taking a security interest in a deposit account, we
should expect many creditors to take deposit accounts. Making
security interests in deposit accounts perfectible through filing might
have had that effect in most transactions. The fixed cost is the filing
itself, not the amount of information that goes on the filing.
This in turn could influence the amount of credit available to
borrowers and could, paradoxically, reduce the amount of credit
available. Given our desire to protect the integrity of the payment
system, money leaving a deposit account will leave free of the security
interest, at least if this takes place in the ordinary course of business.5°

50. See, e.g., J.I. Case Credit Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 991 F.2d 1272, 1279-80 (7th Cir.
1993); R. § 9-332.
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If I get cash from an ATM and buy dinner, the restaurant needs to be
able to receive the cash free and clear of preexisting security interests.
As a result, absent a fair degree of monitoring or preplanning, a
secured creditor cannot depend on receiving anything from the
deposit account. (Label such a creditor a "nonreliance" creditor, as it
should not rely on receiving a particular amount from the deposit
account.) For a secured creditor to be willing to undertake this
preplanning so as to rely on the deposit account as collateral, it must
have a way of getting a return on its costs. A prior filed statement
covering the deposit account would reduce the incentive of a
subsequent secured creditor to incur the planning costs required to
capture value in the deposit account. This will either require the
subsequent secured creditor to negotiate a subordination agreement
as to the deposit account with the first creditor or to simply decline to
lend in reliance on the deposit account. We have mismatched priority
in the deposit account: the nonreliance creditor has priority, while the
reliance creditor would have been junior. The nonreliance creditor
did not extend credit based on the deposit account-it had no plans to
monitor the account and would just take whatever was in the account
when the debtor got in financial trouble-while the reliance creditor
refuses to extend credit, as it cannot be assured of a return on the
costs necessary to make reliance sensible given the existence of the
priority nonreliance creditor. To say that the two creditors should
negotiate a subordination agreement is to give only a partial response
at best, as this will often be quite costly.
We should ask why the debtor agreed in the first place to give
the security interest in the deposit account to the nonreliance
creditor. It was suggested above that the marginal cost of creating the
security interest in the deposit account was zero, given that a security
agreement and financing statement were already in the works. But,
you might respond, that focuses only on the ministerial costs of
creating the interest; from the debtor's perspective, the biggest cost
should be the borrowing opportunities lost from giving this security
interest. In this story, the debtor has given something of little value to
the nonreliance creditor and seems to have received nothing in
return. The debtor would have been better off to save the security
interest in deposit accounts for the later reliance creditor. So why was
the security interest given to the nonreliance creditor? In consumer
transactions and in many small-business commercial transactions,
many people would not regard this as a particularly meaningful
inquiry. These would be described as contracts of adhesion-take it
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or leave it contracts-without any meaningful possibility of
51
negotiation.
But the problem may be even more fundamental. Suppose we
have two types of borrowers. Some borrowers will have little
understanding of the contracts and will not seek to negotiate over
details. They will make decisions over those items they do understand
readily-perhaps price-and will ignore the rest. Other borrowers
will have the knowledge and ability to negotiate but may be unwilling
to do so. Borrowers that do understand the contracts may risk
signaling to a prospective lender-by negotiating over the scope of
the security interest-that they will aggressively pursue their rights
against the lender. The lenders, as a group, may prefer to screen out
these aggressive borrowers, as they may be higher-cost borrowers to
deal with. A lender might offer two contracts, a contract with the
deposit account clause and lower fees, and a second without the
deposit account clause and higher fees. Ignorant borrowers would
decide on price and would accept the contracts with the deposit
account clause. What would the informed borrower do? Such a
borrower might lose more from being separated from the ignorantwhich would identify the borrower as an aggressive borrower-than
she would gain from avoiding the deposit account clause, so she might
accept the contract with the deposit account as well. Put differently,
aggressive borrowers may prefer to be pooled with more passive
borrowers.
We should be clear about the source of the market failure here.
Cross-subsidization drives this for the informed borrowers. They want
to avoid being known as such so they can dump off on ignorant
borrowers some of the costs they will later impose on lenders and that
will, in turn, be passed through to consumers. In the pooling outcome,
these costs are borne by all consumers-the ignorant subsidize the
knowing as to these costs-when they are passed on to consumers by
lenders. The only question is which contract will result in the pooling
equilibrium. We could easily end up in the inefficient deposit account
contract where the nonreliance creditor takes the security interest in
the deposit account. If the costs of taking the security interest in
deposit accounts were higher, the nonreliance creditor might not do
so, the reliance creditor could then do so, as it would have priority
and could recover the policing costs for the deposit account, and more

51. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 37, § 4.26, at 295.
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2
credit would be available.

IV. PERFECTION HIERARCHIES

I have suggested that permitting filing of security interests
against deposit accounts as original collateral might have had the
perverse effect of reducing the availability of credit as compared to
the prior nonuniform system for taking security interests in deposit
accounts. This story shows two possible policy instruments at work;
differential costs by collateral type and exclusion from Article 9 as a
clumsy way of creating costs differentials. It might be possible to
include deposit accounts in Article 9, increase uniformity, and reduce
transaction costs without reducing available credit in the way
described above. Indeed, this is perhaps exactly what has been done
in Revised Article 9 by insisting that a secured creditor take control
over a deposit account to have a perfected security interest in it as
53
original collateral.
A. Restoringthe Right Match
In the nonuniform system under old Article 9, deposit accounts
as original collateral were matched with reliance creditors through
the high costs that had to be incurred to create a perfected interest.
By bringing deposit accounts into Article 9 but maintaining a
marginal cost for perfecting the security interest in deposit accounts,
we may have achieved the same successful match. The requirement
that the secured creditor take control over the deposit account to
perfect its security interest in it as original collateral does exactly this.
The higher costs associated with control will reduce the chances that
secured creditors will take casually a security interest in deposit
accounts.
Note that, for these purposes, it would have been sufficient to
have embraced the idea of a perfection hierarchy completely, as we
have done for investment property, letters-of-credit rights, and
electronic chattel paper. We could have permitted a secured creditor
to perfect a security interest in a deposit account through filing but
52. An alternative characterization might be that the cross-subsidy is the way in which the
ignorant consumers compensate the knowing for actions by the latter that redound to the
benefit of the former. This turns on the question of to what extent the actions by the knowing
that induce the higher costs redound to the private benefit of the knowing consumer and to
what extent they spill over to benefit all consumers.
53. See R. § 9-314.
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allowed a secured creditor who subsequently took control over that
deposit account to trump the first secured creditor's position. Such a
two-tiered perfection approach would have made it possible for a
later secured creditor to obtain priority over an earlier-filed secured
creditor without negotiating a subordination agreement with that
creditor. As noted before, this priority may be essential for the
reliance creditor to be able to obtain value from the deposit account
and, therefore, essential if the creditor is to lend against that asset.
Such a two-tiered priority scheme- and recall that this is the one we
have embraced for investment property, letter-of-credit rights, and
electronic chattel paper-would have made it possible to get the right
match between potential collateral and secured creditors with an
attendant expansion of credit. The critical question, though, for this
to work, is whether the costs of obtaining control-really the
marginal costs relative to filing-are sufficiently large so as to
discourage the nonreliance creditor from taking control.
If we step back and ask what the secured transactions system
should seek to achieve, we might want priority devices that had
different costs for different creditors so that the appropriate collateral
match was achieved. The opposite extreme -identical
costs of
creating priority positions as against the relevant assets-runs the risk
of substantial mismatches of collateral and creditor, with an overall
reduction in the level of credit available. Financing statements are in
a basic sense the great cost leveler. The marginal cost of perfecting
(absent a multi-tiered perfection/priority system of achieving priority
as to) a security interest in additional collateral is zero. Simplifying
the rules for filing financing statements, as has been done in Revised
Article 9, pushes the marginal costs closer to zero. Only by
reintroducing a marginal cost do we make it possible to correctly
match creditors and collateral.
B. The Role of Control
The decision to not allow filing against deposit accounts reflects
other interests unrelated to structuring competition among secured
creditors. Instead, this reflects a judgment that a nonreliance secured
creditor who does not take control over the deposit account has no
legitimate claim to whatever value happens to be found in that
account on some settling date. Of course, we do not insist that
secured creditors take control of collateral generally, so the basis for
distinguishing deposit accounts from, say, inventory or accounts, is
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not immediately obvious. We, therefore, should turn to assessing the
role of control in secured transactions more generally.
Control has important historical roots in secured transactions in
the United States and continues to play a deciding role in the British
system of secured transactions. Dominion over the collateral was
precisely the issue at stake in what is perhaps the best known decision
in early U.S. secured transactions law, that in Benedict v. Ratner. 4 It is
worth recounting the facts of that case. Slightly four months before its
eventual demise, the Hub Carpet Company purported to assign all
present and future accounts to Ratner to secure loans made by him to
the company. Accounts in existence at the time of the original deal
were enumerated in a listing given to him then. Every month
thereafter, Ratner received a listing of new accounts arising since the
last listing. Benedict, who took over initially as receiver and then as
trustee in Hub Carpet's bankruptcy, challenged the assignment as
fraudulent against creditors and, therefore, void.
Although Ratner had the right to insist that proceeds of the
receivables be paid over to him, Hub had no duty to do so absent a
demand. Indeed, Hub had the right to use the proceeds as it saw fit to
buy new inventory, to create new receivables, or to squander the
money on worthless investments. Of course, everyone expected Hub
to buy new inventory with the proceeds. The standard cycle is to
borrow money, buy inventory, sell it and thereby create receivables,
collect the receivables, and plow the money back into the business.
Ratner argued that the doctrine of ostensible ownership did not
apply to accounts receivable. 5 As intangibles, there was nothing for
other creditors to observe and, therefore, no basis for confusion from
"ostensible ownership. 5 6 The Court pushed this aside quickly and
honed in on Ratner's failure to control the proceeds of the
receivables:
But it is not true that the rule stated above and invoked by the
receiver is either based upon or delimited by the doctrine of
ostensible ownership. It rests not upon seeming ownership because
of possession retained, but upon a lack of ownership because of
dominion reserved. ...It imputes fraud conclusively because of the
reservation of dominion inconsistent with the effective disposition
of title and creation of a lien.5

54.
55.
56.
57.

268 U.S. 353 (1925).
See id. at 362.
See id.
Id. at 362-63.
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It is the "unrestricted dominion over the proceeds '58 which is
dispositive in defeating Ratner's claim. The Court makes clear the
steps Ratner should have taken to preserve his position: "Where the
mortgagor of chattels agrees to apply the proceeds of their sale to the
payment of the mortgage debt or to the purchase of other chattels
which shall become subject to the lien, the mortgage is good as
against creditors, if recorded."5 9 So record, and insist upon payment
or the purchase of new receivables.
Step back and consider the decision on the merits. On one view,
the Court tossed a major wrench into the basic gears of secured
transactions. Receivables are the proverbial Heraclitan river, ever
changing yet remaining the same. The floating stock of receivables
changes, to be sure, day by day, but the individual items comprising
the mass are not the issue, the mass itself is. If a secured creditor
cannot get an effective security interest on after-acquired receivables,
we have removed an important source of collateral for supporting
loans.
Of course, Benedict didn't say anything like this. Instead, the
decision merely insists that the secured creditor police its debtorcontrol the debtor-if the security interest in receivables is to be
effective. Benedict provides a road map as to how to make these
transactions effective. Indeed, lawyers were sufficiently successful
that a robust industry in these arrangements arose. Nonetheless, the
costs of these arrangements were ultimately seen to outweigh the
benefits. In the drafting of old Article 9, Benedict was overruled by
statute; 60 a fully-effective security interest could be granted in present
and future receivables and the secured creditor need not police how
the proceeds of these receivables are used.
It is interesting that the British system of fixed and floating
charges is tied directly to these issues of control and comes out
squarely in favor of the regime defined by Benedict and abandoned
by Article 9. In the British system, the freedom given to the debtor in
the use of the charged property-the collateral-determines whether
property may be subject to a fixed or a floating charge. Property that
the debtor holds and uses but does not intend to transfer to third
parties can be subject to a fixed charge. 61 Equipment is a natural

58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 364.
Id. at 363.
See UCC section 9-205 and its official comments.
See R.M. GOODE, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CREDIT AND SECURITY 9 (2d ed. 1988).
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example: the debtor uses the equipment and in the ordinary course of
business intends to hold it. After registration of the fixed chargepublic recording-third parties take the property subject to the fixed
charge. This is true both for purchasers and for execution creditors.
Both of these results track the Article 9 rules for a security interest in
equipment, as such a security interest would survive a sale 62 and
would be prior to the interest of a lien creditor.
In contrast, assets that the debtor deals with freely as to third
parties-inventory is the key example-cannot be subject to a fixed
charge and may only be subject to a floating charge. 63 The floating
charge is in some sense inchoate: it is not effective against buyers and
execution creditors prior to an event known as crystallization. As to
these charges, Article 9 and the British system are in sync for buyers
in the ordinary course. Revised section 9-320(a) cuts off a security
interest in inventory, while the British buyer is not subject to the
uncrystallized floating charge. 64 The key difference is the treatment of
a lien creditor. The Article 9 security interest in inventory is good
against the lien creditor, both genuine lien creditors under Revised
section 9-317(a) and hypothetical lien creditors under section 544 of
the Bankruptcy Code. The uncrystallized floating charge is not good
against a lien creditor nor is it spared from the invasion of claims
given a statutory preference in a liquidation. 65 The structure of this
system means that a group of assets-those that can be subject to no
more than a floating charge-are always up for grabs. The holder of
the floating charge can lose out to execution creditors prior to
crystallization.
In this scheme, the control that the debtor exercises over
inventory prevents the secured creditor from having a fully effective
charge against those assets. This is similar in many ways to the
scheme contemplated by Benedict, and all of this suggests that we
should be cautious in embracing Article 9's choice in favor of
perfected floating security interests on inventory and receivables
without the secured creditor exercising some control over the
collateral.
In fact, we might say more. Until very recently, Article 9 had two
primary ways of perfecting a security interest, filing and possession.

62.
63.
64.
65.

See R. §§ 9-315(a)(1), 9-320(a).
See GOODE, supra note 61, at 15.
See id. at 52.
See id.
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Although filing may be an acceptable substitute for possession as to
the notice provided to third parties, it is a very poor stand-in for
possession when it comes to exercising control over the collateral. For
the debtor to give up possession of the collateral also entailed giving
up control over the collateral and assured all creditors of the debtor
that the debtor could not misuse the asset. In contrast, filing has no
direct consequence for control. The filed secured creditor can ignore
the debtor and still enjoy priority based on its earlier financing
statement.
Perfection through possession is in many ways a holdover from
secured transaction's days in the primordial soup. It has been used
only infrequently as an instrument of policy for influencing outcomes,
UCC section 9-308 being the prime example. That has left us with
only one policy instrument, the financing statement, and we have
done nothing with that, such as having different filing fees for
different asset types or for situations where a creditor was taking a
security interest in more than one asset type. (Fees could follow a
step-ladder: take one asset type, pay once price, take two asset types,
pay more, etc.) We also could introduce control much more generally
into Article 9 and use that as a policy instrument and, to some extent,
Revised Article 9 has done so. As suggested above, control might
ensure that we avoid mismatches between collateral and reliance and
nonreliance creditors. To a large extent, reliance and control should
travel together. In the deposit account example, the nonreliance
creditor exercised no control over the deposit account but hoped to
reap the benefit of the reliance creditor's control efforts. Of course,
under plausible conditions, that means that no one exercises control
and, hence, the pool of assets available as collateral shrinks.
We can let our imaginations run as to the ways that control might
be used. Consider two schemes briefly. We could expand the
financing statement records to embrace control and noncontrol
creditors (or active and passive secured creditors, if you prefer). The
financing statement would permit a designation of the type of
creditor. Passive creditors-either so designated or as the default
designation -could be subordinated to later-filing active creditors,
again by identification on the financing statement. Of course, all
creditors would want to be active creditors, absent a kicker, so the
real question becomes what it should be. We could use filing fee differentials. This scheme is a before-the-fact designation scheme for
control. An alternative is to allow a competitive market in exercising
control to evolve, with after-the-fact judicial evaluation of the

1999]

PERFECTIONHIERARCHIES AND NONTEMPORAL PRIORITY RULES

1187

contributions made by the creditors in exercising control over the
debtor. We get some of that already now since control is one of the
indicia giving rise to liability in lender liability litigation. 66 We would
want to distinguish bad control, which typically relates to direct
control over the decision making of the debtor, from good control,
which focuses on the treatment and use of the collateral.
CONCLUSION

Possession long ago ceased to be a meaningful instrument for
implementing secured transactions policy. The move every day to
electronic transactions means that we need to find a substitute
instrument, and control is the natural successor to possession. Having
two robust perfection methods-filing and control-makes it possible
to embrace a strong scheme of perfection hierarchies and to move
back from the elemental rule of UCC section 9-312(5). Revised
Article 9 has taken careful, small steps down this path, as befits the
natural conservatism associated with large-group law reform. This
also takes us away from temporal priority and to one that tracks the
desire for secured creditor attention to collateral seen in Benedict v.
Ratner. We should be willing to embrace perfection hierarchies tied
to control. In reaching that conclusion, this article has emphasized the
following points:
* Inducing Fidelity Through Penalties.Creditors insist that their
debtors tell them about outstanding security interests. Absent
a legal bar, these representations and warranties could be tied
to a penalty clause. Creditors would then invest resources in
determining whether the debtor breached its promise, and the
threat of enforcement of the clause against the debtor in good
times might induce the debtor to comply with its promise. This
approach is limited, though, by legal limits on the use of
penalty clauses.
* Voluntary Disclosure of Prior Secured Creditors. Debtors
might want to disclose the existence of a prior secured
creditor. Secured creditors play a policing role that may
redound to the benefit of all creditors.
* Filing's Beneficiaries: Unperfected Security Interests and
Lending Decisions by Unsecured Creditors. Unsecured
66. See, e.g., State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App. 1984, writ
dism'd by agr.). For discussion, see Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics of Lender Liability, 99
YALE L.J. 131 (1989).
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creditors should not key their lending decisions to the state of
the public filing record against the debtor. Unsecured
creditors always face a loss of priority to a later secured
creditor. There is, therefore, little reason to think that public
recordation of security interests is important for the lending
decisions of unsecured creditors.
The Levy as Public Good: Unperfected Security Interests and
Enforcement Decisions by Unsecured Creditors.This may not
be true of enforcement decisions. Unsecured creditors may
consult the public records before undertaking involuntary
collection to see if there are any free assets available. If secret
security interests - unperfected security interests-were
effective against a levying unsecured creditor, we would make
it less likely that an unsecured creditor would bother to
collect. That might be a bad thing, as a levy conveys valuable
information about the debtor to other creditors.
Structuring Competition Among Creditors. Public filing rules
help define the structure of competition that takes place
among creditors both for lending and for monitoring and
enforcement.
Cost Differentials and the Scope of Security Interests. Having
collateral subject to Article 9 and its rules covering financing
statements makes the cost of creating and perfecting a security
interest the same for all creditors. Excluding collateral from
Article 9-as we have traditionally done with deposit
accounts-creates cost differentials among creditors.
Matching Collateral and Creditors: Reliance and Nonreliance
Creditors. Cost differentials can help match collateral with
creditors. Absent a cost, creditors may take too much
collateral. Uninformed borrowers will ignore the scope of the
security interest sought, while informed borrowers may be
reluctant to tip their hands by negotiating over the scope of
the security interest. An initial creditor may take a very broad
security interest without any intent of taking the steps
necessary to ensure a return on some of the collateral. At the
same time, the breadth of the security interest taken by the
nonreliance creditor may impair the ability of a reliance
creditor to obtain a return on its investment in monitoring
collateral. All of this shrinks the credit available to the debtor.
Perfection Hierarchies.A perfection hierarchy may solve this
problem. Let perfection through filing vest priority rights
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against one class of creditors, say unsecured creditors and lien
creditors. At the same time, create a second method of
perfection-say, control-that makes it possible for a second
creditor to jump ahead of the filed secured creditor. If this
second method of perfection is sufficiently costly, we will
discourage nonreliance creditors from using it and thereby
create a way for reliance creditors to recover on their efforts
by allowing them to obtain priority. This structure does a
better job of matching collateral taken and reliance on it,
assuming that control is a good proxy for reliance.

